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ROCHE v. WORLDWIDE MEDIA, 
INC.: EVALUATING WHERE 
MINIMUM CONTACTS MEETS 
CYBERSPACE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Roche v. Worldwide Media, Inc.,l the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia discussed 
the issue of personal jurisdiction in the context of cyberspace.2 
The court determined that Worldwide Media's web site was 
passive3 and that asserting personal jurisdiction based solely 
on the maintenance of a web site, without more, would violate 
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 
The Roche decision reaffirmed the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia's position on personal jurisdiction in the context of 
cyberspace.5 Specifically, this decision applies the logic of the 
"sliding scale"6 test borrowed from the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and adopted 
by the Eastern District of Virginia.7 The "sliding scale" test 
incorporates the spirit and intent of the International Shoe 
"minimum contacts" test to address whether the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on the operation 
1 Roche v. Worldwide Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
2 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 717. 
3 See infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
4 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 718. 
5 See id. at 717. 
6 See infra note 69. 
7 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 717-718. See also Rannach, Inc. v. The Rannach 
Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
293 
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of a web site alone is consistent with due process.8 
II. FACTS 
Brien Roche, hereinafter "Roche", is a trial attorney and a 
citizen of Virginia. 9 Roche registered and received confirma-
tion that Network Solutions, Inc. reserved the domain name 
"triallawyer.com" in his name. 10 Some time after receipt of 
this confirmation, Roche visited "traillawyer.com" expecting to 
see an "under construction" notation on the web site.l1 In-
stead, Roche found that Worldwide Media, Inc, a Florida cor-
poration, and Michael Howard Berkens, a Florida resident, 
collectively "Worldwide", were already operating "trail-
lawyer. com" as an adult pornographic web site. 12 Roche al-
leged that he was deeply offended and disgusted by his inad-
vertent viewing of the pornographic images portrayed on the 
"traillawyer.com" site. 13 
In actuality, Worldwide operated "triallawyer.com" as an 
advertising venue for other Internet web site operators. 14 In 
exchange for a fee,15 Worldwide placed advertising banners 
with images depicting a variety of explicit sexual acts and be-
haviors on the "triallawyer.com" web site.16 Visitors to "trial-
lawyer.com" were prompted to click on a banner if they 
wished to view more material. 17 Each banner contained links 
8 See Zippo Mfg. Co. u. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126 (W.D. Pa. 
1997). See also International Shoe Co. u. Washington, 326 U.S. 320 (1945). 
9 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 715. 
10 See id. at 716. Network Solutions, Inc. is a domain name registry service 
where an individual can purchase the rights to a given domain name on a first-come, 
first-served basis for a $100 registration fee. See Panauision Int'l u. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 
1316, 1318 (1998). 
11 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 716. 
12 See id. at 716. 
13 See id. 
14 Telephone interview with Alexander Rhodes, Attorney for Worldwide Media, 
Inc., Associate, Annis, Mitchell, Cockey, Edwards, & Roehn, P.A. (October 5, 2000). 
Worldwide also maintained three other Internet web sites, "triallawyers.com", "tri-
alattorney.com", and "trial attorneys. com", that operated in a similar fashion. See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See Complaint of Plaintiff at '1110, Roche 90 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Va. 2000) (No. 
99-1534-A). The web site "triallawyer.com" contained explicit images of oral, anal, and 
group sex, and solicited the display of other forms of sexual behavior. See id. 
17 See Telephone interview with Alexander Rhodes, supra note 14. 
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to other pornographic web sites operated by independent third 
parties.18 The web site "triallawyer.com", however, did not so-
licit visitor's credit card information, or provide visitors with 
Worldwide's contact information such as telephone number or 
email address.19 Moreover, visitors could not send comments 
to Worldwide or submit classified ads to be posted on the 
"traillawyer.com" web site.20 In short, "traillawyer.com" was 
nothing more than a conduit responsible for redirecting In-
ternet traffic to other pornographic web sites.21 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On October 15, 1999,22 Roche filed a five-count complaint 
against Worldwide in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia.23 The complaint alleged actual 
and constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. 24 Roche, however, 
was unable to dispute Worldwide's ownership of the domain 
name since he and Worldwide had each registered the domain 
name "triallawyer.com" with separate yet equally legitimate 
domain name registry services.25 Roche's complaint also in-
cluded a prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin 
Worldwide from continuing to operate the site.26 
On December 1, 1999,27 Worldwide filed a motion to dis-
miss Roche's complaint alleging that the Eastern District of 
Virginia lacked personal jurisdiction over Worldwide.28 The 
court granted the motion and the Eastern District of Virginia 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 See Complaint, 90 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Va. 2000) (No. 99-1534-A). 
22 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 714-715. 
23 See id. at 714. 
24 See Complaint, Roche 90 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Va. 2000) (No. 99-1534-A). 
25 See Telephone interview with Alexander Rhodes, supra note 14. 
26 See Complaint, Roche 90 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Va. 2000) (No. 99-1534-A). 
27 See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Roche 90 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Va. 2000) (No. 
99-1534-A). 
28 See id. at 715. Worldwide Media, Inc. made the motion to dismiss pursuant to 
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(2). Because the Eastern District lacked personal jurisdiction over 
Worldwide, the court did not discuss the merit of the allegations in the complaint. 
See id. 
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dismissed Roche's complaint on January 4, 2000.29 On March 
27, 2000, the Eastern District of Virginia issued its Memoran-
dum Opinion.30 
IV. BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORICAL JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS UNDER PENNOYER V. 
NEFF 
Before a court can hear a case, the court must have juris-
diction over the subject matter of the suit and the parties to 
the action.31 Personal jurisdiction refers to the court's ability 
to assert jurisdiction over the parties to the action.32 Histori-· 
cally, personal jurisdiction was governed by the strict physical 
presence requirements of Pennoyer v. Neff.33 In Pennoyer, the 
United States Supreme Court limited personal jurisdiction of 
a state court to instances where a non-resident defendant 
owned property within the forum state or was served within 
the forum state. 34 However, these limitations eventually 
proved too rigid as advances in communication, technology, 
and the advent of the corporation as a legal entity obviated 
the need for parties in a commercial transaction to share the 
same physlcallocation.35 
B. MODERN JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
SHOE V. VVASHINGTON 
In 1945, the Supreme Court abandoned the strict physical 
presence requirements of Pennoyer in favor of a more flexible 
approach with its decision in International Shoe v. VVashing-
ton. 36 In International Shoe, a non-resident corporation was 
subjected to the jurisdiction of a Washington state court even 
29 See id. at 719. 
30 See id. at 714. 
31 See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CML PROCEDURE 4 (West Publishing Company, 6th 
ed. 1993). 
32 See id. 
33 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US. 714 (1877). See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 US. 235, 
251 (1958). 
34 See Pennoyer at 717. 
35 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 US. 220, 222 (1957). 
36 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US. 310 (1945). 
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though its state of incorporation and principal place of busi-
ness was outside of the forum state.37 Asserting personal ju-
risdiction under International Shoe requires a two-step analy-
sis.3s First, the defendant must have "minimum contacts" with 
the forum state.39 Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must not 
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice."40 
In establishing "minimum contacts," the non-resident 
defendant must fall under the reach of the forum state's long-
arm statute.41 Typically, if the defendant has sufficient "mini-
mum contacts" with the forum state to satisfy due process 
then those activities will also bring the defendant under the 
jurisdiction of the state's long-arm statute.42 The Virginia 
long-arm statute, for example, authorizes jurisdiction to the 
fullest extent permitted by due process.43 
C. JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS AFTER INTERNATIONAL SHOE 
Since International Shoe, several cases have presented 
the Supreme Court with the opportunity to clarify and elabo-
rate on the meaning of "minimum contacts" and "traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice."44 The line of cases 
following International Shoe has shown a clear trend toward 
expanding jurisdiction.45 Nevertheless, these decisions have 
remained in line with the policy goals of International Shoe of 
preventing a state from extending its authority beyond per-
missible boundaries and preventing a defendant from litigat-
ing in a distant or inconvenient forum. 46 
37 See id. at 310. 
38 See Rannoch, Inc. v. The Rannoch Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684 (E.D. Va. 
1999). 
39 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320. 
40 See id. 
41 See Rannoch, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 684. 
42 See George B. Delta & Jeffrey H. Matsuhara, Law of the Internet, §3.02[A] 
(2000). 
43 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 716. 
44 See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
45 See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. See also World· Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
46 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
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In World-Wide Volkswagen Cor:p v. Woodson,47 the United 
States Supreme Court overturned an Oklahoma Supreme 
Court ruling that held a New York automobile retailer subject 
to the jurisdiction of an Oklahoma court based on the for-
seeability that the car would enter Oklahoma.48 In ruling that 
forseeability alone is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's conduct 
and connection with the forum state should be such that he 
reasonably anticipates being haled into court in the forum 
state.49 
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,50 a Michigan resident 
entered into a fast-food restaurant franchise agreement with 
a Florida corporation. 51 Throughout the franchise relationship, 
all agreements, negotiations and contracts between the par-
ties were executed by telephone or mail. 52 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court held that the franchisee was subject to Flor-
ida jurisdiction because he had purposely availed himself of 
the benefits and protections of Florida laws when he entered 
into the franchise agreement. 53 In other words, the absence of 
physical contacts was not enough to defeat Florida's assertion 
of personal jurisdiction. 54 
D. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND CYBERSPACE 
In 1996, due process made a leap into cyberspace in Com-
puServe, Inc. v. Patterson. 55 In CompuServe, Patterson, a 
Texas resident, entered into a contractual relationship with 
CompuServe,56 an Ohio corporation, which allowed Patterson 
to transmit and post his software product on the CompuServe 
47 World· Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
48 See id. at 297-298. 
49 See id. 
60 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
51 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 466. 
52 See id. at 48l. 
153 See id. at 482. 
54 See id. at 476, 487. 
55 CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (1996). 
56 CompuServe is a computer information service that contracts with individuals 
to provide computing and information services to subscribers via the Internet. See id. 
at 1260. 
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system for other subscribers to use and purchase. 57 When 
CompuServe began marketing a similar product, Patterson 
threatened suit. 58 In response, CompuServe filed an action in 
an Ohio federal court seeking a declaration that it had not in-
fringed upon Patterson's trademark. 59 Consequently, Patterson 
moved to dismiss CompuServe's action for lack of personal ju-
risdiction.60 The trial court granted Patterson's motion to dis-
miss stating that Patterson's contacts with Ohio were too ten-
UOUS.61 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.62 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reached its opinion by 
meshing the traditional "minimum contacts" analysis with the 
unique set of circumstances presented by activities conducted 
in cyberspace.63 Citing McGee v. International Life Insurance 
Company,64 the court determined that Patterson, like Interna-
tional Life Insurance Company, had established a connection 
with Ohio when he 1) entered into the Shareware Agreement 
with CompuServe, and 2) repeatedly transmitted computer 
files from his computer to the CompuServe system.65 The 
court concluded that Patterson created a purposeful and ongo-
ing relationship with CompuServe and, as a result, he should 
have reasonably foreseen that doing so would have conse-
quences in Ohio.66 Finding the record replete with ways in 
which Patterson purposely availed himself to the benefits and 
protections of Ohio law, the court determined that Ohio's as-
sertion of jurisdiction over Patterson did not violate due 
process.67 . 
Just six months after CompuServe, Zippo Mfg. Co. v. 
Zippo Dot Com68 provided another significant development in 
personal jurisdiction in cyberspace. In that case, Zippo Manu-
facturing, a Pennsylvania corporation, sued Zippo Dot Dom, a 
57 See id. at 1260. 
58 See id. at 1266. 
59 See id at 1266. 
60 See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 126l. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. at 1268-1269. 
63 See id. at 1262-1263. 
64 See id at 1266, citing McGee, 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
65 See id. 
66 See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1265. 
67 See id. at 1266. 
GB Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (w. D. Pa. 1997). 
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California Internet-based news subscription service, in Penn-
sylvania District Court for trademark dilution, trademark in-
fringement, and false designation.69 Zippo Dot Com moved to 
dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.70 The Dis-
trict Court denied the motion. 71 
In its opinion, the court fashioned a "sliding scale" test to 
determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction based 
on the operation of an Internet web site alone is consistent 
with due process. 72 The test is premised on the theory that 
whether a forum state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
a non-resident defendant is consistent with due process is di-
rectly proportionate to the nature and quality of the commer-
cial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. 73 In 
other words, the greater the commercial activity over the In-
ternet the more likely it will be that the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction with be consistent with due process.74 
The "sliding scale" test posits three points along a contin-
uum. 75 At one end of the spectrum the defendant clearly con-
ducts business over the Internet.76 For example, personal ju-
risdiction is proper in cases like CompuServe v. Patterson 
where the defendant knowingly enters into contracts with re-
sidents of a foreign jurisdiction via the Internet.77 At the op-
posite end of the spectrum a defendant has only posted infor-
mation on a "passive" web site that is accessible to users in a 
foreign jurisdiction.78 The exercise of personal jurisdiction in 
69 See id. at 1121. Zippo Dot Com registered the domain names "zippo.com", 
"zippo.net", and "zipponews.com" with Network Solutions, Inc., an Internet domain 
name registry service. See id. at 1121, 1121 n.3. 
70 See id at 1121. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. at 1124. 
73 See id. at 1124. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1127. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. See also Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) where the plaintiff's trademark action was dismissed for lack of personal juris-
diction after the court determined that defendant's web site was passive because it 
did nothing more than provided users information about the defendant's jazz club. If 
a user wanted to visit the defendant's club, he would have to call or visit a ticket out-
let and pick up the ticket at the club on the night of the show. See id. 
76 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1122. 
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these instances violates due process.79 Finally, in the middle 
are situations where the user can only exchange information 
with a host computer.80 In those situations, the court evalu-
ates the commercial nature and level" of interactivity of the in-
formation exchanged between the user and host computer to 
determine whether as assertion of personal jurisdiction is 
proper.81 
Zippo Dot Com, in the opinion of the court, did more than 
advertise or post information on a web site.82 The record 
before the court clearly indicated that they were doing busi-
ness in Pennsylvania over the Internet.83 Citing International 
Shoe, the court stated "the test has always focused on the na-
ture and quality of the contacts with the forum state and not 
the quantity of those contacts."84 As a result, the court deter-
mined that Zippo Dot Com's activities were of a nature and 
quality that the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the West-
ern District would not violated due process.85 
Applying similar logic, the same district court that de-
cided Roche reached an opposite conclusion in Rannoch, Inc. v. 
The Rannoch Corp.86 Rannoch, Inc., hereinafter "Rannoch-Va," 
a Virginia corporation, provided engineering and computer 
services to firms in the aviation, communications and naviga-
tion businesses.87 The Rannoch Corporation, hereinafter "Ran-
noch-Tx," a Texas corporation, arranged steam railroad train 
vacations for individuals as a way of promoting the hobby of 
79 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. at 718. 
80 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
81 See id. See also Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
In Maritz, the court provides a good analysis of a case in which the court had to eval-
uate the level of interactivity between the host and user to determine whether the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction was consistent with due process. See id. 
82 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125. 
83 See id. The facts before the court indicated that 2% of Zippo Dot Com's sub-
scribers were Pennsylvania residents, Zippo Dot Com actively solicited user names, 
addresses, and credit card information from subscribers, and that Zippo Dot Com had 
contracted with seven Internet service providers in Pennsylvania to furnish their ser-
vices to its Pennsylvania customers. See id. at 112l. 
84 See id. at 1127. 
86 See id. 1126. 
86 See Rannoch, 52 F. Supp. 2d 68l. 
87 See id at 682. Rannoch-Va owned federal trademarks for different variations of 
the term "Rannoch" including "Rannoch" combined with a fanciful "R", "Rannoch Cor-
poration", and "Rannoch". See id. 
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steam railroading.88 Rannoch-Va sued Rannoch-Tx in the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia alleging trade-
mark infringement and unfair competition. 89 
The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction, citing that there was no evidence 
that Rannoch-Tx was conducting business over the Internet in 
Virginia.90 Instead, the court noted that all Rannoch-Tx had 
done was post a web page on the Internet with the possibility 
that someone in Virginia might access it.91 Under these cir-
cumstances, the court said, without more, the exercise of ju-
risdiction is not consistent with due process.92 
V. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The task before the United States District Court for the. 
Eastern District of Virginia in Roche v. Worldwide Media, Inc. 
was to determine whether the court could assert personal ju-
risdiction over Worldwide based exclusively on its operation of 
the "triallawyer.com" web site.93 To permit personal jurisdic-
tion, Worldwide must first fall under the long-arm statute ju-
risdiction of the Eastern District of Virginia.94 Virginia law ex-
tends long-arm statute jurisdiction to the fullest extent 
88 See id. 
89 See id. Rannoch-Va alleged that the Eastern District of Virginia had jurisdic-
tion over the defendant based on its operation of two web sites, "rannoch.org" and 
"steam-training.com", which were accessible in Virginia. The web sites provided ways 
to contact the defendant, including telephone and fax numbers, mailing address and 
email address. Seeid. at 682-683. The sites also provide spaces for potential advertis-
ers to submit their classified listings. See id. at 682. Finally, Rannoch-Va alleged that 
the defendant's advertisements in a nationally circulated magazine called "Trains" 
also subject it to the jurisdiction of the Virginia court. See id at 683 n.3. 
90 See id. at 683. The court found there was no evidence that Rannoch-Tx as-
sisted or made travel arrangements for any person in Virginia, placed any classified 
ads on its web sites for products or persons in Virginia, had done business in Vir-
ginia, had sold products in Virginia, had held meetings in Virginia, or conducting any 
advertising specifically directed to Virginia. See id. Furthermore, Rannoch-Tx was not 
authorized to do business in Virginia, owned no property in Virginia, had no bank ac-
counts in Virginia, had no telephone listings in Virginia, had no employees in Vir-
ginia, and did not maintain records in Virginia. See ~d. 
91 See Rannoch, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 683. 
92 See id at 687. 
93 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 714, 716. 
94 See id. at 716. 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol31/iss3/4
2001] MINIMUM CONTACTS IN CYBERSPACE 303 
permitted by due process.95 Due process requires that a non-
resident defendant maintain "minimum contacts" with the fo-
rum state before the forum state may assert jurisdiction over 
him.96 The essence of the analysis, therefore, merges into the 
single question of whether the assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion over Worldwide is consistent with due process.97 If it is, 
then long-arm statute jurisdiction is permissible over World-
wide and the suit may proceed.98 
Since Worldwide's only contact with Virginia was its web 
site, the court had to determine whether the nature and qual-
ity of those contacts were enough to establish "minimum con-
tacts" and, therefore, be consistent with due process.99 To do 
so, the court applied the reasoning of the "sliding scale" test 
borrowed from ZippO.100 The nexus of this court's analysis was 
to evaluate the facts of this case in light of the three points 
along the "sliding scale" continuum,101 and characterize the 
site as active or passive.102 
The record before the court lacked any evidence to estab-
lish that the Worldwide web site was an "active" web site.103 
Analogizing Worldwide to Rannoch-Tx in Rannoch, the court 
noted that there was no evidence that Worldwide had employ-
ees in Virginia, held meetings in Virginia, or sold products in 
Virginia.104 Furthermore, there was no evidence that World-
wide conducted advertising or promotional activity that was 
directed specifically to Virginia.105 In short, the court con-
95 See id. 
96 See id at 717. 
97 See id. at 716. 
98 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 716. 
99 See id. at 715. 
100 See id at 717-718. See also Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125-1126. 
101 A web site can occupy one of three spaces along the "sliding scale" contin-
uum-passive, active or in between. See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 717-718. The asser-
tion of jurisdiction over operators of active web sites is consistent with due process. 
See id. at 718. The operators of passive web sites are not subject to jurisdiction in the 
forum state because the characteristics of the web site do not satisfy minimum con-
tacts. See id. Finally, jurisdiction in the instances when the contacts fall somewhere 
in between these two positions is determined by looking to the commercial nature 
and level of interactivity that occurs on the web site. See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. 
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cluded, there was no evidence that Worldwide did anything 
more than post information on a web site with knowledge 
that someone .in Virginia may access the site. lo6 Numerous 
cases have held that this, without more, is not grounds for 
the exercise of jurisdiction.107 Doing so, could lead to nation-
wide jurisdiction over anyone who posts a web page. lOS There-
fore, concluding that Worldwide did nothing to avail them-
selves of the benefits of Virginia law or purposely direct their 
activities at Roche, the court determined that the Eastern 
District's exercise of jurisdiction over Worldwide would violate 
due process.109 
VI. CRITIQUE 
The Eastern District of Virginia correctly dismissed 
Roche's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.110 Once the 
defendant raises the issue of personal jurisdiction, the plain-
tiff carries the burden of proving its existence by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 111 The court, in its determination of 
whether personal jurisdiction comports with due process, 
should construe all allegations in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff and draw the most favorable inferences in favor 
of asserting jurisdiction.112 Even construing Roche's complaint 
liberally, however, there is no evidence that Worldwide pur-
posely availed itself to the benefits of Virginia law. 113 As a re-
sult, the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia would violate due process.114 
In light of the limited information provided in the plead-
ings, there was no evidence to support the Eastern District's 
exercise of jurisdiction. Clearly, the major fatal error of this 
case was deficient pleadings. That is not to say, however, that 
a better set of facts would have led to a different outcome. A 
106 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 718. 
107 See, e.g., Rannoch, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 684. 
108 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 719. 
109 See id at 718-719. 
110 See id. at 719. 
111 See id. at 716. 
112 See Roche, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 718. 
113 See id. at 718. 
114 See id. at 719. 
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better set of facts may certainly have allowed the case to sur-
vive beyond the motion to dismiss. 
Better facts and pleadings may have allowed this action 
to survive a motion to dismiss because there is something in-
tangible that distinguishes this case from Rannoch or Com-
puServe. This court based its dismissal on the fact that, in 
sum, Worldwide had done nothing to purposely avail itself of 
the benefits of Virginia law or purposely direct its activities 
towards Roche. 115 In effect, this decision means that only a 
Florida court may exercise personal jurisdiction over World-
wide. This position is logically inconsistent with the idea that 
an individual can place a web site on the Internet with the 
knowledge, and perhaps specific intent, that anyone anywhere 
in the world that is connected to the Internet may access the 
site and nevertheless be insulated from the jurisdiction of 
most of the courts where the site is accessed. In fact, it seems 
that what makes the Internet such an attractive commercial 
vehicle is its ability to reach such a wide audience. The incon-
gruity lies in the fact that by achieving its apparent purpose 
of mass exposure, the Worldwide web site becomes immune 
from the jurisdiction of most state courts. 
On the other hand, the potential for nationwide or world-
wide jurisdiction is equally as troubling. The "sliding scale" 
test, like the "minimum contacts" test, attempts to incorporate 
both the quality and quantity of a defendant's contacts with 
the forum state into the analysis. Nevertheless, there seems 
to be the element of the intent of an Internet web site that is 
not captured by the quality and quantity analysis of the "slid-
ing scale" test. As a result, this case could spawn a debate 
about the propriety of the "sliding scale" test as a method of 
due process analysis and whether it leads to just results. Per-
haps the answer is that the underlying constitutional guaran-
tees of due process are so important that we would rather 
have a plaintiff take his case elsewhere that have a defendant 
litigate in a distant or inconvenient forum. 
115 See id. at 718. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Personal jurisdiction and the Internet is an evolving area 
oflaw.116 Nevertheless, the jurisdictional issues that have sur-
faced by the advent of the Internet are reoccurring ones. 
Since International Shoe, the traditional and, more recently, 
the cyberspace line of jurisdictional cases have all struggled 
with how much contact is necessary for the forum state to jus-
tify its exercise of jurisdiction.117 Whether its phrased as the 
"sliding scale" or "minimum contacts," CompuServe, Zippo, 
Rannoch, and now Roche, all demonstrate that courts are still 
concerned with purposeful availment, "minimum contacts", 
and "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 
Clearly, while the Internet has pushed the boundary of these 
concepts the fundamental concerns remain the same. 
Indeed, technological innovation will continue to put pres-
sure on well-established principles of due process. Fortu-
nately, the legal community is well aware of the difficulties 
that the Internet presents. In July 2000, the American Bar 
Association issued a report entitled "Achieving Legal and Bus-
iness Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Is-
sues Created by the Internet."118 While offering some solu-
tions, the report cautions that its propositions are not 
absolute answers.l19 Instead, the authors of the study, the 
ABA Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project, intend for the re-
port to be the beginning of an ongoing dialogue on the 
issue.120 
Ryan Thomas* 
116 See id. at 717. 
117 See Delta, supra note 39, at §3.02. 
118 James Podgers, Adapting to a New World, A.B.A. Journal, November 2000 at 
98. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
* I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to my journal editor, Patricia 
Caldwell, and research editor, Kristin Henry, whose efforts were equal to mine in 
putting this piece together. 
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